Saturday, August 29, 2015
Thursday, September 3, 2009
Single-Engine Pilot Lands Twin TurboProp at Fort Meyers
On April 12, 2009, a Beech B200 turboprop (N559DW) was landed uneventfully by a pilot-rated passenger at Fort Meyers, Florida. The flight began from Marco Island, Florida. Shortly after the certificated airline transport pilot completed the climb checklist, the owner, who was a single-engine priavte pilot and sitting in the right seat, noticed that the pilot's head was down and both hands were at his sides. As the airplane continued to climb through 6000 feet, the owner attempted to get the pilot's attention but he made an audible sound which increased in intensity, and the pilot's right hand fell off his thigh. The pilot did not make any further sounds. The owner declared an emergency, and advised the controller that he needed to speak to someone familiar with the Beech B200.
The Beech B200 is a twin-turboprop transport and utility aircraft with a flight deck that seats a crew of two and is fitted with dual controls although it can be flown by a single pilot. The B200 has a service ceiling of 35000 feet and a cruise speed of 290 knots (about 330 MPH) at 25000 feet. While in contact with Miami Center, the flight continued climbing on a on a northerly heading to about 17000 feet. Communications were then transferred to Fort Meyers Approach Control who helped the owner through the process of disengaging the autopilot, initiating a descent, and with heading changes.
Communications were then transferred to Fort Myers Approach Control. While in contact with Approach, the controller helped the owner with vectors toward Fort Meyers (KRSW), and details about the landing gear, flaps, power levers, and airspeed settings. Fortunately weather was not a problem (i.e., VMC), and finally the flight was vectored for a 15-mile final for RWY 6. The owner landed uneventfully, and taxied onto a taxiway where the engines were secured.
Click here to listen to the audio between the pilot and the controller during this emergency.
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Source: NTSB #ERA09IA240
Tuesday, August 25, 2009
Should VOR's Have Names?
Recently a widebody transport aircraft was enroute to Houston Intercontinental (KIAH) when the radios developed static that interfered with ATC instructions while holding near thunderstorms. Houston ATC directed the aircraft, using phonetics, to the Leona VOR, but the clearance understood by the crew was to the LEONA intersection. As the First Officer of the aircraft notes, this raises the question of why VORs even need names at all when modern flight management systems are in use.
We were placed in holding northeast of IAH. AUS was our alternate. There were thunderstorms and we were placed in high altitude holding. We were concerned about fuel and the Controller advised that the delay may be long enough to cause a divert to AUS. If we waited, we were advised that we would be sent to the other side of the field for a different arrival -- not specified. Eventually, a cell neared our holding location. We asked to be moved and while waiting, the static on the radios made hearing Center very difficult. Eventually, the Captain and I both heard the Controller phonetically spelling L-E-O-N-A. That is what the Captain even wrote on his scratch paper. I was typing that in the FMS and hit direct. We were on about a 210 degree heading when another aircraft relayed a new frequency to us. At some point there we also heard to join an arrival off of LEONA. We checked on with the new Controller who asked where we were going. We told him LEONA. He gave us a new heading to 270 degree and told us it was the LOA (LEONA) VOR and not the LEONA Intersection. This all happened very quickly, but there were several factors that could have changed what happened. 1) If it were possible (and I don't know if it was) to give us the name of the expected arrival from the other side of the airport, we would have already seen that there was a VOR named LEONA. 2) The Controller could have phonetically spelled the VOR ID and not the VOR name. This raises the question of why VORs even need names at all in an FMS environment. 3) We could have had faster situational awareness of the fact that an intersection 400 miles away was probably a misunderstanding. Luckily it was solved easily and quickly as we regained communication ability.
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Source: FAA ASRS Database, ACN #830144
Thursday, May 28, 2009
Icing the Dash-8
According to the NTSB, more than 25 accidents occur annually due to inflight icing. Here is an account by a Dash-8 Captain with 5200 hours of logged time explaining icing experiences:
We started picking up Super Cooled Large Droplets or as I call it huge water drops which go beyond a foot after contact before they freeze on the windshield. If it goes farther, then it is getting behind our deicing equipment in my experience. Every time I have seen -8 degrees C and clear ice I had gotten an inch of ice within a minute and also every time requested lower right away.
The worst time was southeast of Aspen where it accumulated at more than 2 inches within the first minute. I lost my windshield completely, put the props to 1200 RPM and told my First Officer who was also a newer Captain flying right seat at the time we needed lower as soon as possible!
We were on vectors and within that first minute we had so much ice on us we had lost 15 KTS which is not normally something the Dash does at all in icing. I knew we could not climb out of it in time, so when ATC gave us lower I had the autopilot off and dove down at 3,000-4,000 FPM to 16,000 FT to get out of that temperature of -8 degrees C. At 16,000 FT we were still picking up light rime but it was +3 degrees C and not a concern anymore. However, that minute and a half or so at -8 degrees C and in Super Cooled Large Droplet conditions had dumped so much ice on the plane I could barely see out my left window at the boots and prop hub.
They were loaded with ice. I felt the plane was limping along. The plane was shaking violently with all the ice on the props. I had had the ice systems on maximum the entire flight. We finally broke out of IMC and [Center] wanted us to call the airport in sight, but I told them we needed to fly for a bit and get lower to melt all the ice as I couldn't see out my window to land. We got lower yet and by -2 to -1 degrees C the ice started breaking off and melting. We finally got cleared for the visual but by the time I started to configure for landing we had melted all the ice.
Excerpted from the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ACN 823412)
We started picking up Super Cooled Large Droplets or as I call it huge water drops which go beyond a foot after contact before they freeze on the windshield. If it goes farther, then it is getting behind our deicing equipment in my experience. Every time I have seen -8 degrees C and clear ice I had gotten an inch of ice within a minute and also every time requested lower right away.
The worst time was southeast of Aspen where it accumulated at more than 2 inches within the first minute. I lost my windshield completely, put the props to 1200 RPM and told my First Officer who was also a newer Captain flying right seat at the time we needed lower as soon as possible!
We were on vectors and within that first minute we had so much ice on us we had lost 15 KTS which is not normally something the Dash does at all in icing. I knew we could not climb out of it in time, so when ATC gave us lower I had the autopilot off and dove down at 3,000-4,000 FPM to 16,000 FT to get out of that temperature of -8 degrees C. At 16,000 FT we were still picking up light rime but it was +3 degrees C and not a concern anymore. However, that minute and a half or so at -8 degrees C and in Super Cooled Large Droplet conditions had dumped so much ice on the plane I could barely see out my left window at the boots and prop hub.
They were loaded with ice. I felt the plane was limping along. The plane was shaking violently with all the ice on the props. I had had the ice systems on maximum the entire flight. We finally broke out of IMC and [Center] wanted us to call the airport in sight, but I told them we needed to fly for a bit and get lower to melt all the ice as I couldn't see out my window to land. We got lower yet and by -2 to -1 degrees C the ice started breaking off and melting. We finally got cleared for the visual but by the time I started to configure for landing we had melted all the ice.
Excerpted from the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ACN 823412)
Friday, May 22, 2009
High winds at Gary?
Here is the METAR this morning for Gary/Chicago Intl Airport in Gary, Indiana:
KGYY 221245Z 350112KT 15SM BKN250 13/10 A3019
Winds from 350 at 112 knots!? The winds since the early morning hours have been from 350 at 8 to 10 knots, so I'm guessing this is just a bad reading by the automated bits on the field.
KGYY 221245Z 350112KT 15SM BKN250 13/10 A3019
Winds from 350 at 112 knots!? The winds since the early morning hours have been from 350 at 8 to 10 knots, so I'm guessing this is just a bad reading by the automated bits on the field.
Thursday, May 21, 2009
Distracted by Tower
Distracted by a Tower request to adjust the transponder, the Captain of a Cessna Citation with 23000 hours (1800 hours in type) crosses the active runway at Houston Hobby (KHOU) without a clearance.
We were taxiing out for takeoff and were cleared to taxi from the FBO to Runway 4 at HOU. As we approached Runway 4, Ground Control called us to ask us to turn our squawk on. I looked over and we were already squawking the proper numbers on both transponders. Rather than let the First Officer handle his job (which he was very capable of doing), I became distracted and taxied across the approach end of Runway 4 to get in line behind a commuter jet holding short of another runway, I believe Runway 35. Of course, my mind was telling me he was holding short of Runway 4 and we were going to follow him. Fortunately, there was no other traffic on the approach to Runway 4 and, therefore, no conflicts with anyone else. This is 'proof positive' that no matter how many hours/years of experience one has, if you lose your concentration for only a moment, it could certainly turn out much worse than this -- a valuable lesson learned by a very experienced pilot. Also, I might add, a very lucky one! This was discovered by Hobby Tower, they told us that we had crossed Runway 4 and to do a 180 degree turn and cleared us for takeoff from the other side. Since there was no conflict -- no harm/no foul, but it is my duty to report this because if this report were to help prevent just one conflict/accident, then it is certainly worth my time.
Report from the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ACN: 818328).
We were taxiing out for takeoff and were cleared to taxi from the FBO to Runway 4 at HOU. As we approached Runway 4, Ground Control called us to ask us to turn our squawk on. I looked over and we were already squawking the proper numbers on both transponders. Rather than let the First Officer handle his job (which he was very capable of doing), I became distracted and taxied across the approach end of Runway 4 to get in line behind a commuter jet holding short of another runway, I believe Runway 35. Of course, my mind was telling me he was holding short of Runway 4 and we were going to follow him. Fortunately, there was no other traffic on the approach to Runway 4 and, therefore, no conflicts with anyone else. This is 'proof positive' that no matter how many hours/years of experience one has, if you lose your concentration for only a moment, it could certainly turn out much worse than this -- a valuable lesson learned by a very experienced pilot. Also, I might add, a very lucky one! This was discovered by Hobby Tower, they told us that we had crossed Runway 4 and to do a 180 degree turn and cleared us for takeoff from the other side. Since there was no conflict -- no harm/no foul, but it is my duty to report this because if this report were to help prevent just one conflict/accident, then it is certainly worth my time.
Report from the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ACN: 818328).
Wednesday, May 20, 2009
Performance Based Navigation (PBN)
Traffic plots made at Chicago Rockford International without and with a PBN design. Source: Miller, S. 2009. Contribution of Flight Systems to Performance-Based Navigation. Aero Magazine. 2:21-28
The FAA defines Performance Based Design (PBN) as "a framework for defining navigation performance requirements that can be applied to an air traffic route, instrument procedure, or defined airspace". The goal of PBN is to consolidate the different types of RNAV and RNP in such a way as to design and implement more accurate and efficient automated flight paths. PBN is the next step forward in the evolution of aeronautical navigation.
Conventional navigation relied on radio beacons, such as VOR, DME and NDB. After RNAV was introduced, airplanes would fly to waypoints that weren't tied to ground-based navaids. RNP, which is based on RNAV, optimized the airspace even further by replacing strict point-to-point routes with more gradual turns.
According to Boeing, which has included RNP capability in every airplane, PBN will result in a significant reduction in track miles through reduced vectoring, saving time, fuel, and emissions. With PBN, the airplane’s own capability determines whether it can safely achieve the specified performance and qualify for the operation. One example of this is the SAAAR approach (i.e., Special Aircraft and Aircrew Authorization Required). CAT II/III approaches are essentially SAAAR, but they assume you're already lined up on final. An example of a PBN-type SAAAR approach is the Palm Springs RNAV RNP Z Rwy 13R apporach (below), which has a finely tuned narrow obstacle clearance path, optimized turn radii, a seamless vertical path.
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